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As the American population ages, the need for long-term care, already great, will
become even greater. Some of this care is paid for by government programs, such
as Medicaid, and by individual long-term care insurance policies. But the com-
bination of the public fisc and private insurance are, and will continue to be,
insufficient to pay for all of the care our seniors and adults with disabilities
need. The provision of care in a family residence by one or more family members
is an important component of our health care delivery system and must be sup-
ported and encouraged by public policy and law. As experts in the law of estate
planning and health care, respectively, we address in this Article the following
question: How might the American law of succession realistically recognize,
support, and promote family caregiving? Our answer is a pragmatic proposal
that can be adopted into the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). We propose a modi-
fied elective share for a family member who has provided the decedent with
substantial uncompensated care in a family residence. (In this context, 'family
member" excludes the decedent's surviving spouse, because the UPC already pro-
vides a spousal share.) Our approach contrasts with the prevailing law in the
U.S., which treats personal services rendered by family members as gratuitous,
hence not compensable. The scope and amount of the caregiver's elective share
can be structured by way of analogy to the surviving spouse's elective share,
though with important differences, as we discuss herein.
INTRODUCTION
As the American population ages, the need for family caregiv-
ing, already great, will become even greater. This Article
addresses the following question: How might the American law of
t This Article was prepared for a symposium at the University of Michigan Law
School on "The Uniform Probate Code: The Remaking of American Succession Law." The
JOURNAL has limited the Article to approximately 10,900 words above and below the line. We
appreciate the research support of the University of Iowa College of Law and the research
assistance of our students Jordan Bergus, Ryan Hilleshiem, and Joshua Orewiler. We also
thank the participants in the Symposium, especially our Commentator, Professor Gerry
Beyer, for helpful feedback.
N. William Hines Chair in Law, University of Iowa; Associate Executive Director,
joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts. In this Article, I am speaking in my
individual capacity only. It is a special pleasure to participate in this symposium honoring
Professor Lawrence Waggoner, my teacher and mentor.
** Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law and Director, National Health Law and Policy
Resource Center, University of Iowa.
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succession realistically recognize and promote family caregiving?
Current American succession law, we argue, is not the regime best
designed to achieve this purpose. The current law amended by
our reform proposal-protection of a family caregiver against dis-
inheritance, modeled on a spousal elective share-will more
effectively recognize and promote the family caregiving needed
by the elderly and disabled.'
Part I of this Article describes the aging of the American popu-
lation and the need for and contribution of family caregiving.
Part II explains aspects of current succession law that are directly
relevant to our proposal. Part III presents the details of our pro-
posal and explores how it might be structured.
I. THE AGING POPULATION AND FAMILY CAREGIVING
The aging of the American population has serious implications
for family caregiving for older persons-those aged sixty-five and
older. In 2009, they numbered nearly 39.6 million (12.9% of the
total population).' The U.S. Census Bureau projects that from
2010 to 2050, their number will more than double, from 40.2 mil-
lion (13% of the total population) to 88.5 million (20.2% of the
total population).3 The "oldest old," those aged eighty-five and
older, are the most likely to require family caregiving and are the
fastest growing segment of the elderly population. The U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau projects that from 2010 to 2050, the "oldest old" will
more than triple, from 5.7 million (14% of the total older popu-
lation) to 19 million (21% of the total older population).'
The aging of the population is driven by members of the post-
World War II baby-boom generation, those born between 1946
and 1964, who began to turn age sixty-five in 2011.' It is also at-
1. Although family caregiving is sometimes needed by children who die before reach-
ing adulthood, most decedents receiving family caregiving shortly before death are elderly
adults. See Part I, infra.
2. ADMIN. ON AGING, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., A PROFILE OF OLD-
ER AMERICANS: 2010 2-3 (n.d.), availabk at http://www.aoa.gov/aoaroot/aging-statistics
/Profile/2010/docs/2010profile.pdf.
3. GRAYSON K VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, THE NEXT FOUR DECADES, THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
2010 To 2050 1, 10 (2010).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 4, 10.
6. Id. at 2.
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tributable to a sharp rise in life expectancy since the beginning of
the twentieth century.
Chronic disease and disability take a disproportionate toll on
the elderly.' Most elders have at least one chronic disease, such as
heart disease, cancer, or diabetes.9 Physical disabilities, such as
vision, hearing, and mobility impairments, increase with age and
are especially frequent in the "oldest old."'o The elderly are par-
ticularly at risk for Alzheimer's Disease and other forms of
dementia, which are characterized by a progressive decline in
memory and impairment of cognitive function severe enough to
interfere with daily life." The prevalence of dementia increases
exponentially from ages sixty-five to eighty-five."
Chronic diseases and disabilities may be accompanied by func-
tional and cognitive limitations that result in an inability to
perform, or difficulty in performing, the activities of daily living
(ADLs) necessary for personal care or the instrumental activities
of daily living (IADLs) necessary for independent living. 3 A sub-
stantial proportion of the elderly population, especially the
"oldest old," have such functional and cognitive limitations.14
Older persons with functional and cognitive limitations fre-
quently need some type of long-term care (LTC), which includes
7. In 1900, the average life expectancy at birth was 47.3 years, whereas in 2009 it was
78.2 years. See LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL32792, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN
THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 29 (2006); KENNETH D. KoCHANEK ET AL., CENTS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, VOL. 59, NO. 4, DEATHS: PRE-
LIMINARY DATA FOR 2009 3 (2011).
8. INST. OF MED., COMM. ON THE FUTURE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE FOR OLDER
AMERICANS, RETOOLING FOR AN AGING AMERICA: BUILDING THE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE
40, 42-45 (2008).
9. See ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 2, at 12; FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING-
RELATED STATISTICS, OLDER AMERICANS 2010: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 27, 100
(2011).
10. FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING-RELATED STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 28, 100;
see also ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 2, at 14.
11. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, TEXT REVISION 147-51 (4th ed. 2000).
12. See Brenda L. Plassman et al., Prevalence of Dementia in the United States: The Aging,
Demographics, and Memory Study, 29 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 128-29 (2007); ALZHEIMER'S
Ass'N, 2011 ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 12 (2011).
13. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH UNITED STATES, 2010, 473, 505
(2011). ADLs include personal care activities, such as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in or
out of chairs, and toileting. IADLs include independent living activities, such as using the
telephone, doing housework, preparing meals, shopping for groceries or personal items,
and managing money. Id.
14. According to a 2007 survey of Medicare beneficiaries aged sixty-five and older, 42%
had limitations on ADLs or IADLs. ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 2, at 14; FED. INTERAGENCY
FORUM ON AGING-RELATED STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 32.
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a wide range of services and supports 1 and is provided in home,
community, and facility-based settings.1 Approximately 70% of
those reaching age sixty-five will need LTC for an average of three
years at some time during their lifetimes.1 7 This need is greatest
among the "oldest old"; persons aged eighty-five and older are
almost four times as likely to need LTC as persons aged sixty-five
to eighty-four.
Formal paid LTC, especially nursing home and other facility-
based care, can be costly.'9 Current national expenditures for
20such care are large and growing.
The federal/state Medicaid program is the single biggest
source of LTC financing, and it-together with the federal Medi-
care program-accounts for the majority of LTC expenditures.
15. See ADMIN. ON AGING, NIH SENIOR HEALTH: LONG TERM CARE 1 (2011), available at
http://nihseniorhealth.gov/longtermcare/selectPrint.html; NAT'L CTR. ON CAREGIVING,
FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: SELECTED LONG-TERM CARE STATISTICS 1
(2005).
16. LTC provided in the home may include personal care, home health care, home-
maker services, friendly visitor/companion services, and emergency response services.
Community-based LTC may include adult day care, senior centers, meal programs, and
transportation services. Facility-based services may include nursing homes, assisted living
facilities, board and care homes, continuing care communities, and adult foster care. See
ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 15, at 3-10.
17. H. Stephan Kaye et al., Long-Term Care: Who Gets It, Who Provides It, Who Pays, and
How Much?29 HEALTH AFF. 11, 11 (2010).
18. See AVALERE HEALTH LLC, LONG-TERM CARE: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
HEALTHCARE REFORM 7 (2008), available at http://www.avalerehealth.net/research/docs
/SCAN_Healthcare_Reform.pdf; see also ADMIN. ON AGING, supra note 2, at 15-16.
19. A 2011 Genworth Financial survey found that the median annual rate was $77,745
for a private nursing home room, $70,445 for a semiprivate nursing home room, $39,135 for
an assisted living facility, $43,472 for home health-aide services, $41,184 for homemaker
services, and $15,600 for adult day care. GENWORTH FIN., GENWORTH 2011 CosT OF CARE
SURVEY 23 (2011); see also METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., MARKET SURVEY OF LONG TERM
Costs 4-5 (2011), available at http://www.metlife.com/mmi/research/2011-market-survey
-long-term-care-costs.html#findings.
20. National health expenditures for care in nursing facilities and other facilities rose
from $85.1 billion in 2000 to $137 billion in 2009 and are projected to reach $218 billion by
2020. National health expenditures for home health care rose from $32.4 billion in 2000 to
$68.3 billion in 2009 and are projected to reach $136.1 billion by 2020. See Sean P. Keehan et
al., National Health Spending Projections Through 2020, 30 HEALTH Avy. 1, 2 (2011); Anne Mar-
tin et al., Recession Contributes to Slowest Annual Rate of Increase in Health Spending in Five
Decades, 30 HEALTH AFF. 11, 12 (2011).
21. Medicaid is a health insurance program for low-income individuals and the disa-
bled. It is state-administered but funded jointly by the federal government and state
governments. Older persons generally must meet income and asset eligibility requirements
in order to qualify for Medicaid. For a concise overview of the Medicaid program, see Kl-
SER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MATTERS, UNDERSTANDING
MEDICAID'S ROLE IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2011), available at http://www.kff.org
/medicaid/tupload/8165.pdf.
In 2010, Medicaid accounted for 40% of total LTC expenditures. KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND LONG-IRM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 1 (2011),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2186.cfm. Medicaid provides comprehensive LTC
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Health insurance policies rarely cover LTC." Although insurance
specifically for LTC can be purchased, it accounts for only a small
23
portion of LTC expenditures. Persons who lack Medicaid or
Medicare coverage for LTC, or private LTC insurance, must pay
directly for such care.2
Informal caregivers, who furnish care without pay, are the
most important source of LTC for elders in home and
community settings." Informal caregivers are predominantly family
coverage. The majority of Medicaid LTC spending historically has been for nursing home
and other institutional care, but there has been a shift towards more LTC spending for
home and community-based care. See, e.g., STEVE EIKEN ET AL., MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE
EXPENDITURES IN FY 2009 1-3 (2010), available at http://www.hcbs.org/files
/193/9639/2009LTCExpenditures.pdf.
Medicare is a federal health insurance program for which all persons aged sixty-five and
older are eligible. For a concise overview of the Medicare program, see HENRY J. KAISER
FOUND., MEDICARE FACT SHEET, MEDICARE AT A GLANCE (2010), available at http://
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/ 1066-14.pdf.
In 2010, Medicare accounted for 23% of LTC expenditures. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDI-
CAID & THE UNINSURED, supra, at 1. Medicare, unlike Medicaid, does not provide
comprehensive LTC coverage. It covers limited post-acute care in skilled nursing facilities
and home health care. See JANEMARIE MULVEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40842,
COMMUNITY LIVING ASSISTANCE SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (CLASS) PROVISIONS IN THE PA-
TIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 2 (2010).
22. See Kaye et al., supra note 17, at 15.
23. In 2010, LTC insurance accounted for only 9% of total LTC expenditures. KAISER
COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 21, at 1. For a discussion of the issues
and problems with respect to such insurance, see generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement
Planning's Greatest Gap: Funding Long-enn Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407 (2007).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148), enacted in 2010, incorpo-
rated the Community living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) program. This
program contemplated that employed adults would voluntarily enroll in the program and,
after paying premiums for a specified period, would receive a cash benefit to help pay for
LTC services and support. For a detailed description of the program, see generally MULVEY
ET AL., supra note 21. In October 2011, however, the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) notified Congress that HHS could not proceed with the Act's implementation
because it could not design a program that would be financially solvent and comply with the
Act's requirements. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y, Health & Human Servs., to Cong.
(Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/letter0142011.html; see U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A REPORT ON THE ACTUARIAL, MARKETING, AND LEGAL
ANALYSES OF THE CLASS PROGRAM (October 2011), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov
/daltcp/reports/2011/class/index.pdf.
24. In 2010, out-of-pocket payments accounted for 22% of total LTC expenditures.
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 21, at 1.
25. Kaye et al. supra note 17, at 15. National estimates of the number of informal care-
givers vary. Based on an analysis of 2009 data from a large telephone health survey,
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and state health departments,
it was estimated that the number of caregivers providing regular care to predominantly
older adult family members or friends was 46.9 million at any given time. LYNN FEINBERG ET
AL., AARP POLICY INST., VALUING THE INVALUABLE: 2011 UPDATE, THE GROWING CONTRI-
BUTIONS AND COSTS OF FAMILY CAREGIVING 23-24 (2011). Based on 2009 data from a
nationally representative survey of caregivers conducted by the National Alliance for Care-
giving and the AARP, it was estimated that the number of caregivers providing unpaid care
to predominantly older adult relatives or friends was 37.3 million at any given time and 54.6
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members." They primarily provide assistance with ADLs and
IADLs." They also increasingly provide nursing care." They usually
spend a significant amount of time, over a significant period of
time, on care activities. 29 The majority of elderly individuals receiv-
ing family caregiving live in their own homes, although some live
in the homes of their caregivers."
The burden of family caregiving can be considerable. In a 2009
national survey of caregivers, over one-half of the caregivers re-
million at any time during the year. Id. Based on a 2010 national survey of adults employed
full-time, conducted by Gallup and Healthways, one in six of such adults are caregivers for
an elderly or disabled family member or friend. Dan Witters, In U.S., Working Caregivers Face
Wellbeing Challenges, GALLUP WELLBEING (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll
/145115/working-caregivers-face-wellbeing-challenges.aspx.
26. Extensive data about the characteristics of caregivers and care recipients is availa-
ble from an in-depth survey of a nationally weighted sample of caregivers providing
assistance to persons aged fifty and older conducted in 2009 by the National Alliance for
Caregiving and the AARP, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2009:
A FOCUSED LOOK AT THOSE CARING FOR THE 50+ (2009) [hereinafter NAC/AARP 2009
REPORT]. According to the survey, 89% of caregivers were providing care to a relative, while
only 11% were providing care to a non-relative. Id. at 20-21. According to the National Alli-
ance for Caregiving: "the typical family caregiver is a 49-year-old woman caring for her
widowed 69-year-old mother who does not live with her" and who is "married and em-
ployed." NAT'L FAMILY CAREGIVERs AsSOCIATION, Caregiving Statistics, http://
www.nfcacares.org/who-are-family-caregivers/caregiving-statstics.cfm (last visited Mar. 28,
2012). See generally NAC/AARP 2009 Report, supra.
27. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 4-5; NAC/AARP 2009 REPORT, supra note
26, at 27-32; NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, WHAT MADE You THINK MOM HAD ALZ-
HEIMER's? 25-27 (2011), available at www.caregiving.org/data/NAC%20Alzheimers
041 1.pdf.
28. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 4-5; K. DONELAN ET AL., CHALLENGED TO
CARE: INFORMAL CAREGIVERS IN A CHANGING HEALTH SYSTEM 21 HEALTH AFF. 222, 225-27
(2002); NAC/AARP 2oog REPORT, supra note 26, at 32-33. Family caregivers perform nurs-
ing tasks such as administering medication, operating medical equipment, and providing
physical and medical therapies and treatments. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 5;
NAC/AARP 2009 REPORT, supra note 26, at 32-33.
29. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 25, at 24 (basing on a 2009 national survey
that it is estimated that caregivers provide an average of 17.9 hours of care per week);
NAC/AARP 2oog REPORT, supra note 26, at 24, 26 (noting that in response to a 2009
national survey, caregivers reported providing an average of 19 hours of care per week to
adults for an average period of 4 years); NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 27,
at 22-23, 25 (stating how in response to a 2011 national survey, 45% of caregivers report-
ed providing eight hours of care per week to adults with Alzheimer's or dementia; 23%
reported providing more than twenty hours of care per week, and 50% reported provid-
ing care for three years or more); see also EVERCARE & NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING,
FAMILY CAREGIVERS-WHAT THEY SPEND, WHAT THEY SACRIFICE 15 (2007), available
at http://www.caregiving.org/data/EvercareNAC-CaregiverCostStudyFINAL20111907.pdf
(noting that, in response to a 2004 survey, family caregivers reported providing an aver-
age of 35.4 hours of care per week with a median of twenty hours of care; 52% reported
providing care for three or more years, and 32% reported providing care for more than
five years).
30. See, e.g., NAC/AARP 2009 REPORT, supra note 26, at 42 (noting in response to a
2009 national survey, caregivers reported that 47% of care recipients lived alone, 28% lived
with a spouse, 13% lived with grown children, and 8% lived with other family members).
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ported a medium to high level of burden.3 ' A 2010 national sur-
vey of the full-time workforce likewise found that those employed
full-time who had caregiving responsibilities suffered from lower
well-being than those without such responsibilities.
Caregiving may have detrimental economic consequences for
caregivers. It often has a negative impact on the employment status
of caregivers, the majority of whom work at some point while
providing care.3 ' Due to caregiving burdens, many take actions
such as quitting work entirely or retiring early," leading to lost
earnings and diminished Social Security benefits, pension benefits,
and retirement savings." Among caregivers who continue to work,
many find that the demands of caregiving adversely affect their
work performance." Moreover, caregivers typically incur consider-
able out-of-pocket expenses in connection with caregiving.37
Caregiving also may have detrimental health and psychosocial
consequences for caregivers. Caregivers are more likely to suffer
from poorer physical and mental health than non-caregivers." In
31. NAC/AARP 2009 REPORT, supra note 26, at 35. Surveyed caregivers were more like-
ly to report a high level of burden if they were primary caregivers, they were older, they were
in fair or poor health, they were not employed, they had lower incomes, or the care recipi-
ent lived with them. Id. The survey, conducted by the National Alliance for Caregiving and
the AARP, used an index to measure the burden of care based on the number of hours of
care per week provided and the number of IADLs performed. Id. at 109.
32. Witters, supra note 25. The survey, conducted by Gallup and Healthways, used an
index consisting of six areas-life evaluation, emotional health, physical health, healthy
behavior, work environment, and basic access to necessities-to measure overall well-being.
33. METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., CAREGIVING COSTS TO WORKING CAREGIVERS, Dou-
BLEJEOPARDY FOR BABY BOOMERS CARING FOR THEIR PARENTs 7 (2011); NAC/AARP 2009
REPORT, supra note 26, at 56-57; NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, THE EVERCARE SURVEY
OF THE EcONOMIC DOWNTURN AND ITS IMPACT ON FAMILY CAREGIVING 5, 34 (2009).
34. See EVERCARE & NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 29, at 22; GENWORTrH
FIN., BEYOND DOLLARS, THE TRUE IMPACT OF LONc TERM CARING 12 (2010); METLIFE MA-
TURE MKT. INST., supra note 33, at 10-12; NAC/AARP 2oog REPORT, supra note 26, at 58.
35. A Metlife Mature Market Institute study concluded: "Total wage, Social Security
and private pension losses due to caregiving could range from $283,716 for men to $324,044
for women, or $303,880 on average for a typical caregiver. When this ... amount is multi-
plied by the 9.7 million people age 50+ caring for their parents, the amount lost is ... nearly
$3 trillion." METLIFE MATURE MKT. INST., supra note 33, at 14.
36. See NAC/AARP 2009 REPORT, supra note 26, at 58 (caregivers surveyed typically re-
ported going in late, leaving early, or taking time off from work because of caregiving
responsibilities); Dan Witters, Caregiving Costs US. Economy $25.2 Billion in Lost Pwductivity,
GALLUP WELLBEING (July 27, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148670/caregiving-costs
-economy-billion-lost-productivity.aspx (stating that 36% of working caregivers reported miss-
ing one to five days of work and 30% reported missing six or more days of work because of
caregiving responsibilities).
37. See, e.g., EVERCARE & NAT'L CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 29, at 20; GENWORTH
FIN., supra note 34, at 8, 11 (stating that primary caregivers contributed an average of $8,800
for out-of-pocket care expenses, excluding cost of facility care, for care recipients).
38. See, e.g., EVERCARE & NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, CAREGIVERS IN DECLINE:
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 5-7, 11-25 (2006); FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, FACT
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addition, caregiving responsibilities may adversely affect caregivers'
relationships with other family members and may lead to their so-
cial isolation.
Estimates of the economic value of unpaid care provided by
caregivers to family and friends range from $199 billion to $450
billion in 2009.'o Even with all of this unpaid family caregiving,
overall Medicaid spending-of which LTC spending is a major
component-is currently "growing at an annual rate that exceeds
state revenues or national economic growth, which leads to budget
pressures at both the federal and state level of government.""
Without unpaid family caregiving, federal and state budgets, al-
ready strained, would have to increase enormously in order to
cover the costs of LTC for the elderly.4 2 And in the absence of ei-
ther unpaid family caregiving or government-funded care, many of
the elderly would have difficulty obtaining LTC, because they lack
43
the personal financial resources to pay for such care.
Given the contribution that families make to meeting the grow-
ing need for LTC, it is important that public policies and laws
support family members in their caregiving role. Our proposal,
SHEET: CAREGIVER HEALTH (2006), available at http://www.caregiver.org/caregiver/jsp
/printfriendly.jsp?nodeid=1822; Dan Witters, In U.S., Caregivers' Emotional Health Often
Suffers, Gallup Wellbeing (May 27, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147815/caregivers
-emotional-health-often-suffers.aspx; Dan Witters, In U.S., Caregivers Sufferfrom Poorer Physical
Health, Gallup Wellbeing, (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll
/145940/caregivers-suffer-poorer-physical-health.aspx.
39. See, e.g., EVERCARE & NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 38, at 5-7, 11-
25; GENWORTH FIN., supra note 34, at 12.
40. DELOrrfE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS & DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF U.S. HEALTH CARE FOR CONSUMERS 8, 10 (2011); FEINBERG ET AL., Supra
note 25, at 2-3.
41. NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE
MEDICAID PORTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT SPENDING 1 (2011). In fiscal year (FY) 2011,
Medicaid expenditures constituted an estimated 23.6% of total spending by the states. Id. at
1. The recent economic downturn and the concomitant high unemployment led to more
demand for Medicaid services while producing a decline in the state revenues available for
Medicaid spending. Id. at 1, 2; see also NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N & NAT'L AsS'N OF STATE
BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES I (Spring 2011).
42. The average annual growth rate of total federal and state Medicaid expenditures
was 14.7% from FY 1966 to FY 2009; total expenditures were $378.6 billion in FY 2009. It is
projected that the average annual growth rate of expenditures will be 8.3% starting in FY
2009, and that expenditures will reach $840.4 billion by FY 2019. CHRISTOPHERJ. TRUFFER,
ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, 201o ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MED-
ICAID 15, 18-19 (2010). In FY 2009, Medicaid LTC expenditures were $111.2 billion, or 31%
of total Medicaid expenditures, and are projected to grow by an average annual rate of 7.5%
for FY 2010 through FY 2019. Id. at 11, 21.
43. SeeJack Vanderhei & Craig Copeland, Can America Afford Tomorrow's Retirees?:
Results from the EBRI-EFRI Retirement Security Projection Model 1 (EBRI Issue Brief No.
263) (2003), available at http://www.pensioncoverage.org/studies-and-statistics/can
.america.affordtomorrows_retirees.pdf.
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described in Part III, is an effort to achieve this objective in the
context of American succession law."
44. Our proposal is intended to contribute to the ongoing, broader debate over
whether and how public policies and laws should support family caregiving. See generally
Janice Keefe & Beth Rajnovich, To Pay or Not to Pay: Examining Underlying Principles in the
Debate on Financial Support for Family Caregivers, 26 CAN. J. ON AGING 77 (2007). Adult chil-
dren historically have been viewed as having an obligation to care for their parents. For a
discussion of the justifications for assigning the care of the elderly to adult children, see Lee
E. Teitelbaum, Intergovernmental Responsibility and Family Obligation on Sharing, 1992 UTAH L.
REv. 765 (1992); Katie Wise, Caring for our Parents in an Aging World: Sharing Public and Private
Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 563 (2002). Filial-responsibility
laws requiring adult children to support their needy parents reflect this view. These laws
exist in a significant number of states, but are rarely enforced. See KATHERINE PEARSON,
FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPPORT STATUTES IN THE U.S. (2008), available at
http://law.psu.edu/file/Pearson/FilialResponsibilityStatutes.pdf; Wise, supra at 573-75.
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal and state governments increasingly assumed responsibil-
ity for the care of the elderly through programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and
Medicaid. Today, the care of the elderly is viewed as a responsibility shared between the
family and the public. Thus, family members are the largest source of LTC for older persons,
while the Medicaid and Medicare programs pay for the majority of LTC from formal care-
givers. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
Although public programs generally have not provided financial support to family care-
givers, some have begun to do so. For different public policy options with respect to
financial support for family caregivers, see B.C. LAW INST. & CAN. CTR. FOR ELDER LAW,
CARE/WORK: LAW REFORM TO SUPPORT FAMILY CAREGIVERS TO BALANCE PAID WORK &
UNPAID CAREGIVING (2010); Janice Keefe et al., Financial Payments for Family Carers: Public
Policy and Debates, in AGING AND CARING AT THE INTERSECTION OF WORK AND HOME LIFE:
BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES 185-206 (A. Martin-Matthews & J. Phillips eds., 2008); LARRY
POLIVKA, PROVIDING FAMILY MEMBERS TO PROVIDE CARE: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
STATES (2001). For a description of the Medicaid Cash and Counseling Demonstration pro-
gram, which permits adults receiving Medicaid-funded personal-assistance services to select
persons, including relatives, to provide and receive compensation for these services, see
STACY DALE & RANDALL BROWN, THE EFFECT OF CASH AND COUNSELING ON MEDICAID AND
MEDICARE COSTS: FINDINGS FOR ADULTS IN THREE STATES (2005); CHRISTINA KENT, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CASH & COUNSELING PROGRAMS GIVEN MAJOR BOOST
(2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/cash-counseling-programs-
given-inajor-boost.aspx.
The use of public funds to pay family members to provide care is controversial. See Keefe
& Rajnovich supra. The main arguments in favor of such use have been summarized as fol-
lows:
[A] n opportunity to be paid for some of their caregiving labor (the same wage level
as unrelated workers) could allow ... [low-wage minority] women to provide needed
care ... while addressing their current and future financial needs ... . Paying family
caregivers will attract some relatives who are outside the workforce, not currently as-
sisting their needy family, and draw them into regular paid employment. For those
family members who are employed, paying them . . . will make it easier for them to
make a commitment to that work, decrease the financial penalty associated with it,
and legitimize their work at a modest public cost.
Lori Simon-Rusinowitz et. al, Payments to Families Who Provide Care: An Option That Should Be
Available, 22 GENERATIONS 69, 70 (1998).
The main arguments against paying family caregivers have been summarized as follows:
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11. CURRENT AMERICAN SUCCESSION LAW
To understand our proposal, it is necessary first to understand
two relevant aspects of current American succession law: (1) the
treatment of probate claims for personal services rendered by fami-
ly members, and (2) the elective share of a decedent's surviving
spouse.
A. Family Personal Services Claims
One of the principal functions of probate and estate administra-
tion is creditor protection-discharging the decedent's debts.
The longstanding rule of law is that the decedent's debts must be
discharged before the satisfaction of devises." The creditor of the
decedent ranks ahead of the beneficiary, as long as the creditor has
an allowed claim.
A family member who rendered services to the decedent faces an
uphill battle in establishing his or her status as a creditor with an
allowed claim. In the absence of an express written contract, the
family member's claim will be precluded in some states by the so-
called dead man's statute, which renders inadmissible any testimony
showing that the decedent entered into an express oral contract.
Absent an express contract, written or oral, a contract with the de-
cedent can be implied, 49 but here too there is a formidable
obstacle: a common-law presumption that services by the dece-
If informal caregivers are paid ... there would be a major shift away from caring as
part of normal family responsibility .... [I1n this and other ways, payment would de-
crease the quality of the caregiving experience for care recipient and caregiver, with
paid services substituting for unpaid care now provided. Because family care is the
dominant mode of provision in long-term care, such a shift would place tremendous
burdens on public expenditures.
Suzanne R. Kukel et al., For Love and Money: Paying Family Caregivers, 27 GENERATIONS 74, 75
(2004).
45. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession,
97 HARV. L. REv. 1108, 1117 (1984).
46. See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., W'ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATEs 626 (4th ed.
2010).
47. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-805 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 240-42 (1998) (priority
of probate claims); § 3-807 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 256-58 (1998) (payment of probate
claims); § 3-902 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 268-70 (1998) (abatement); § 6-102(b) (2011), 8
U.L.A. pt. II, at 241 (1998) (creditors' rights in nonprobate transfers).
48. On dead man's statutes, see I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 276-79 (5th ed. 1999);
Recent Development, Evidence-The Dead Man s Statute: State Legislatures and Courts Conflict, 25
AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 213 (2001).
49. See generally CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.20 (rev. ed. 1993 & Supp. 2011).
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dent's familyo were rendered gratuitously, hence are noncompen-
sable.5' Rebutting this presumption is possible, but difficult, and
requires an investigation into the facts of the particular case.
A relatively recent Illinois statute on family claims departs from
the common-law approach and is pertinent to our proposal. This
statute, which is part of the state's Probate Act, allows family mem-
bers who reside with and care for a "disabled person" to file a claim
for reimbursement in probate court after the disabled person's
death. 3 The term "disabled person" is defined in the state's Pro-
bate Act as:
a person 18 years or older who (a) because of mental deterio-
ration or physical incapacity is not fully able to manage his
person or estate, or (b) is a person with mental illness or a
person with a developmental disability and who because of his
mental illness or developmental disability is not fully able to
manage his person or estate, or (c) because of gambling, idle-
ness, debauchery or excessive use of intoxicants or drugs, so
spends or wastes his estate as to expose himself or his family to
want or suffering, or (d) is diagnosed with fetal alcohol syn-
drome or fetal alcohol effects. 54
The statute applies to "[a]ny spouse, parent, brother, sister, or
child of a disabled person who dedicates himself or herself to the
care of the disabled person by living with and personally caring for
the disabled person for at least 3 years."" A family member satisfying
this description is "entitled to a claim against the estate upon the
50. The definition of "family" for this purpose is often flexible and fact-based. See, e.g.,
Estate of Marks, 187 S.W.3d 21, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (describing "family" for this pur-
pose as a concept related to "mutual dependence and 'reciprocal kindness'" even in the
absence of "ties of consanguinity or affinity"); Gibson v. McCraw, 332 S.E.2d 269, 275 (W. Va.
1985) ("Relationship by blood or marriage is . . . a factor bearing on the question of whether
a family relation existed . . . .").
51. For cases affirming the existence of the presumption, see, e.g., Worley v. Worley,
388 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1980); Brown v. Brown, 524 A.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. 1987); Stafford v.
Stafford, 402 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); In re Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W2d 894, 901
(N.D. 1983). In Louisiana, the presumption applies as long as a parent "[or] other ascend-
ant[]" is not "in need." See IA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 229 (2009); Succession of Francke, 52
So.2d 855, 857 (La. 1951).
In some states, the presumption relates to family members in the same household. See,
e.g., Riddle v. Edwards, No. S-9706, 2001 WL 34818270, at *2 (Alaska Oct. 10, 2001); Sullivan
v. Delisa, 923 A.2d 760, 769-70 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007); Della Ratta v. Della Ratta, 927 So.2d
1055, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re Estate of Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 464 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1994); Prickett v. Womersley, 905 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. 2009).
52. See cases cited in note 51, supra.




University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
death of the disabled person.",'" The statute provides that the claim
"shall take into consideration the claimant's lost employment
opportunities, lost lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress
experienced as a result of personally caring for the disabled
person.",5
The statute establishes a "minimum" amount the claimant
should receive depending on the extent of the decedent's disabil-
ity: $45,000 in the case of "25% disability," $90,000 for "50%
disability," $135,000 for "75% disability," and $180,000 for "100%
disability.""8 However, a court can reduce the amount of an award
"to the extent that the living arrangements were intended to and
did in fact also provide a physical or financial benefit to the claim-
ant."" In making this determination, the court is authorized to
consider the following factors, among others:
(i) the free or low cost of housing provided to the
claimant;
(ii) the alleviation of the need for the claimant to be
employed full time;
(iii) any financial benefit provided to the claimant;
(iv) the personal care received by the claimant from the
decedent or others; and
(v) the proximity of the care provided by the claimant
to the decedent to the time of the decedent's
death.c'o
The statute was enacted in 198861 with subsequent amendments
effective in 19926' and 2008;63 but the statute raised constitutional
concerns, and lawyers hesitated to use it. 4 In 2002, the Illinois Su-
preme Court resolved the concerns by declaring the statute
constitutional.
The statute is far from perfect. For example, it gives no guidance





60. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-1.1 (2011).
61. Ill. Pub. Act 85-1417, § 4 (effectiveJan. 1, 1989).
62. Ill. Pub. Act 87-908, § 1 (effective Aug. 14, 1992).
63. Ill. Pub. Act 95-315, § 5 (effectiveJan. 1, 2008).
64. See Margot Gordon, Custodial Claims: Compensation for Family Caregivers, 98 ILL. B.J.
256, 257 (2010).
65. In w Estate ofJolliff, 771 N.E.2d 346, 350-57 (Ill. 2002).
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"50%," or "75% ." Nevertheless, the statute furnishes a partial plat-
form for our proposal.
B. The Surviving Spouse's Elective Share
Prevailing American law limits the decedent's testamentary free-
dom in order to ensure, by statute, that the decedent's surviving
spouse receives at least a specified portion of the decedent's es-
tate.6 ' These statutes, known as elective-share statutes, answer two
principal questions: first, what property of the decedent is included
in the decedent's "estate" and, hence, is subject to the elective
share? Second, of the property to which the elective share applies,
to what portion is the surviving spouse entitled?
Let us address the first question first. Under traditional law -
and still in some states -the elective share applies only to the
decedent's probate estate, meaning property that would ordinarily
pass according to the terms of the decedent's will or-to the extent
the will is ineffective or the decedent died without a will-the law of
701intestate succession. Such an elective share works well for the
66. This point was made by then-Governor James R. Thompson when he issued an
amendatory veto directed at section 4 of the legislation. See 1988 Ill. House J. 7524-25. The
statute was enacted over the governor's veto. 1988 Ill. House J. 7585-86; 1988 Ill. Senate J.
6140.
67. SeeJohn H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share,
22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304 (1987) (purpose of elective share). Forty states and
the District of Columbia provide protection to the decedent's spouse through the law of
succession by providing a surviving spouse with a statutory elective share, also known as a
forced share. Nine states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Tex-
as, Washington, and Wisconsin) provide analogous protection during the marriage through
the law of marital property, also known as community property. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 9.1-.2 (2002) (elective share); see generally
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 350-51 (5th ed. 2011). Alaska is an optional community-property
state; married persons resident in Alaska may elect to classify some or all of their assets as
community property. SeeJonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Tax Planning with Consensual Commu-
nity Property: Alaska's New Community Property Law, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 615, 617
(1999). Georgia is the only separate property state without an elective share statute. See Ver-
ner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's
Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447 (1976) (arguing that elective-share statutes
are unnecessary). For the opposite view, see generally Peter H. Strott, Note, Preventing Spous-
al Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA. L. REv. 427 (1985).
68. On the traditional law, see Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the
Uniform Probate Code: In Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REV. 981, 990 (1977).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2011); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-8 (2011); N.H. STAT. § 560.10 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE § 2106.01 (West 2011)
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-5-101 (2011).
70. On the probate estate as governed by "[t]he law of wills and the rules of descent,"
see Langbein, supra note 45, at 1108.
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surviving spouse when the decedent's property is wholly or mostly
in the probate estate. In the modern era, however, a significant
part (sometimes even all) of a decedent's wealth is in the form of
so-called will substitutes, such as life insurance policies, pension
plan accounts, joint bank accounts, pay-on-death (POD) bank
accounts, securities registered in transfer-on-death (TOD) form,
TOD deeds, and revocable trusts.7 ' These forms of property
typically pass directly, and outside of probate, to the designated
beneficiaries. Such "nonprobate" transfers are not part of the
decedent's probate estate and, therefore, are not subject to the
surviving spouse's elective share when the elective share applies
only to the probate estate." The availability of will substitutes
presents an opportunity for a decedent to circumvent the
traditional probate-centered elective share-unless a court
determines (and some have) that the decedent's transfer of the
property into a will substitute was illusory 3 or fraudulent," and
thereby void, at least for the purpose of the elective share.
Responding to the rise of will substitutes, modern elective-share
statutes, such as Article II, Part 2, of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC)," include both probate and nonprobate transfers in the de-
cedent's "augmented estate," and it is the property in the
augmented estate-not just in the probate estate-to which the
elective share applies. Jurisdictions with an augmented estate
concept vary by how comprehensively they reach nonprobate
transfers. Some jurisdictions, for instance, exclude life insurance
proceeds from the augmented estate (hence rendering them ex-
71. Id. at 1109-15.
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1
cmt. i (2002) (describing the "evasion" invited by a regime in which the elective share ap-
plies only to the decedent's probate estate).
73. For cases articulating the "illusory transfer" doctrine, see Newman v. Dore, 9
N.E.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. 1937); Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 409 S.E.2d
337, 338-39 (S.C. 1991).
74. For a case articulating the "fraudulent transfer" doctrine, see In re Froman, 803
S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 249 (N.H. 1983).
75. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 843 P.2d 240, 248 (Kan. 1992) (making the assets
of a revocable trust available for purpose of the elective share without entirely invalidating
the trust).
76. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -214 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 73-95 (Supp. 2011).
77. See, e.g., § 2-204, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 104 (1998) (including in the augmented estate
"the value of decedent's probate estate, reduced by funeral and administration expenses,
homestead allowance, family allowances, exempt property, and enforceable claims"); § 2-
205, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 105 (1998) (including in the augmented estate "the value of the dece-
dent's nonprobate transfers to others").
78. See, e.g., §§ 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 76 (Supp. 2011) ("The surviving spouse of
a decedent who dies domiciled in this State has a right of election .. . to take an elective-
share amount equal to 50 percent of the value of the marital-property portion of the
augmented estate.").
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empt from the spouse's elective share) .7 The UPC's elective-share
provisions, however, apply broadly to nonprobate transfers of
property "owned or owned in substance by the decedent immedi-
ately before death."8 The UPC also includes in the augmented es-
estate certain nonprobate transfers made by a decedent during his
lifetime to a third party (such as an irrevocable transfer of property
in which the decedent retained a life estate)." The UPC's aim is to
include in the augmented estate all of the decedent's relevant
property without regard to whether the decedent arranged to
transfer it inside or outside of probate.
We now turn to the second question addressed by elective-
share statutes: To what portion of the decedent's estate is the
surviving spouse entitled? Traditional elective-share statutes8
provide that the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third
(sometimes one-half) of the property to which the elective share
applies." Thus, if the decedent died owning property worth
$300,000, the surviving spouse would be entitled to $100,000 (or
perhaps $150,000) as an elective share. Some states still take this
approach. 5 The modern view, however, is that the elective share
should reflect the duration of the marriage." A surviving spouse
of a long-term marriage should receive a greater portion of the
decedent's estate than the surviving spouse of a short-term
marriage. The UPC exemplifies this modern approach. It
provides that the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the
"marital-property portion of the augmented estate," with that
phrase defined according to a sliding percentage." If the
79. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-222 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 (2008);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (2010).
80. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(1) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 80 (Supp. 2011). Note
the issue of federal preemption with respect to will substitutes governed by ERISA. For a
discussion, see Thomas P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185
(2004).
81. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(1)-(2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 80-81 (Supp. 2011).
82. The UPC also includes in the augmented estate the decedent's transfers to the sur-
viving spouse, plus the surviving spouse's property and transfers to third parties. UNaw.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-206 to -207 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 115-18 (1998).
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 9.1, cmt. c (2002) (describing dower and its role as an "antecedent" of the elective share).
84. Lawrence W Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a
Reassessment, 37 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 1, 2 (2003).
85. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (entitling the surviving spouse to one-third of
the estate if the testator leaves a descendant, or one-half of the estate if the testator leaves no
descendants).
86. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the
Revised Unforn Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REv. 223, 247-48 (1991).
87. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011).
88. § 2-203(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 79 (Supp. 2011).
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decedent and spouse were married for fifteen years or more, the
marital-property portion of the augmented estate is 100 percent,"
with the surviving spouse entitled to half (50 percent).O If the
decedent and spouse were married for less than fifteen years, the
marital-property portion of the augmented estate is reduced from
100 percent on a sliding scale (the portion is 92 percent for a
marriage lasting at least fourteen but less than fifteen years, 84
percent for a marriage lasting at least thirteen but less than fourteen
years, 76 percent for a marriage lasting at least twelve but less than
thirteen years, and so on), with the surviving spouse entitled to half
92of that portion. The aim of the UPC's sliding scale is to
approximate the accumulation of marital property in a community-
property regime while keeping the percentages straightforward and
manageable. Thus, with respect to a marriage lasting fifteen years
or more, the UPC presumes that all (100 percent) of the property
owned by either spouse will have been the fruit of their marital
partnership, hence the UPC provides that the surviving spouse
should get half of this (or 50 percent) as an elective share." With
respect to a contrasting example of a marriage lasting less than a
year, the UPC presumes that very little (only 3 percent) of the
property owned by either spouse will have been the fruit of the
marital partnership,"6 hence the UPC provides that the surviving
spouse should get half of this (or 1.5 percent) as an elective share.
The traditional rationale for the elective share is support.
Spouses owe each other a duty of support and care during the
marriage, and the central idea behind the traditional elective share
is that the support obligation should continue despite the dece-
dent's death.9" Put differently: The decedent should not be able to
disinherit the surviving spouse because to do so would wrongly de-
prive the surviving spouse of support.
The principal modern rationale for the elective share is marital
partnership." Each spouse is a partner in the marital enterprise
and contributes to it; one spouse should not be allowed to with-
89. Id.
90. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011).
91. § 2-203(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 79 (Supp. 2011).
92. § 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011).
93. For discussions by the principal drafter of these provisions, see Waggoner, supra
note 86, at 247-51; Waggoner, supra note 84, at 9-11.
94. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 79 (Supp. 2011).
95. § 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011).
96. § 2-203(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 79 (Supp. 2011).
97. § 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011).
98. See Waggoner, supra note 86, at 251 (describing the support theory of the elective
share).
99. See id. at 236-42 (describing the partnership theory of the elective share).
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draw from the partnership-in other words, to divert-the other's
contributions.
Even in modern elective-share statutes, however, there is also an
element of support.'00 Indeed, it is fair to say that ideas of marital
partnership and support taken together, albeit with more emphasis
on the former, provide the theoretical basis for the modern elec-
tive share.""o And underlying both of these concepts is the bedrock
understanding that spouses have reciprocal obligations of care and
102concern.
III. OUR PROPOSAL
In this Part, we explain our proposal and place it within its
scholarly and legal context.
A. The Scholarly and Legal Context
In his recent article, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Free-
dom,1 03 Professor Joshua Tate compared the American tradition of
104testamentary freedom -meaning, the freedom to transmit prop-
erty at death to whom, and in the manner, one wishes 5 _to two of
its international alternatives: the "family maintenance,,to systems in
100. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 76 (Supp. 2011)
(providing a supplemental share to bring the surviving spouse up to $75,000).
101. See id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 67-74 (Supp. 2011) (drawing
on the partnership and support theories to explain the UPC's elective-share provisions).
102. Wedding vows often refer to these reciprocal obligations. See generally NOAH
BENSHEA &JORDAN BENSHEA, A WORLD OF WAYS TO SAY "I Do" 69-90 (2004).
103. Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 129 (2008).
104. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 cmt. a (2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is
freedom of disposition.").
105. Donative freedom (of which testamentary freedom is a component) can be de-
scribed as follows:
Freedom of disposition, or donative freedom, encompasses several distinct yet related
ideas-the right to give property away during life and to pass it on at death, the right
to choose who gets it, the right to choose the form in which they get it, and the right
to give another person the right to make those choices even after your death.
GALLANIS, supra note 67, at 9.
106. For scholarly commentary on testator's family maintenance (TFM), see Rosalind F.
Atherton, Family Provision Legislation in Common Law jurisdictions, in INTERNATIONAL ACADE-
MY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW: SELECTED PAPERS 1997-1999 (Rosalind F. Atherton ed.,
2001); Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Colum-
bia, 1998 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1998); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
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England' 7 and the Commonwealth'os (which grant judges the flex-
ibility to alter the terms of the decedent's will in order to provide
additional support for the decedent's surviving family members),
and the "forced heirship" regimes in Louisiana'09 and Continental
Europe"o (which prevent the disinheritance of children by mandat-
ing that they receive at least a fixed percentage of the parent's
estate). Professor Tate argued that the American tradition of tes-
tamentary freedom has a modern justification: the promotion and
reward of caregiving within the family."' By allowing the testator
full discretion to reward a child who provides care for an elderly
or infirm parent more than other siblings (by giving the caregiv-
ing child a greater portion of the testator's estate), Professor Tate
argued, the American law of succession is superior to its Anglo-
Commonwealth and civilian counterparts."2
We agree with Professor Tate that the law of succession should
encourage family members to provide care for elderly and infirm
parents and relatives. Lacking empirical data, however, we are not
certain that the traditional American approach to the law of suc-
cession is the one best suited to support and promote family
caregiving. Some scholars, most recently Professor Frances Foster,
have argued for a behavior-based approach to succession, linking
inheritance rights to the beneficiary's conduct toward the dece-
dent during the decedent's life. Professor Foster's insightful
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165 (1986); Helene S. Shapo, A
Tale of Two Systems: Anglo-American Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60
TENN. L. REv. 707 (1993).
107. See generally Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975 (U.K.).
For discussion, see U.K. LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 191, INTESTACY AND
FAMILY PROVISION CLAIMS ON DEATH 15-37 (2009), available at http://Vww.justice.gov.uk
/lawcommission/docs/cpl9l_ntestacyConsultation.pdf.
108. See Karl Heinz, Intestate Succession, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPAR-
ATIVE LAw 44 (Konrad Zweigert & Ulrich Drobnig eds., 1981).
109. Louisiana amended its forced-heir provisions in 1995 to apply only to children
aged twenty-three or younger and to adult children "who, because of mental incapacity or
physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administer-
ing their estates at the time of the death of the decedent." See 1995 La. Acts 3368 (codified
as amended at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493(A) (West 2012)). The latter category is defined
to include "descendants who, at the time of death of the decedent, have, according to medi-
cal documentation, an inherited, incurable disease or condition that may render them
incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates in the future." IA. CIV.
CODE Anm. art. 1493(E) (West 2012). For discussion, see Katharine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heir-
ship Changes: The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55 (1996).
110. For discussion, see Michael McAuley, Forced Heirship Redux: A Review of Common Ap-
pmaches and Values in Civil Law jurisdictions, 43 Loy. L. REv. 53 (1997).
111. See Tate, supra note 103, at 170.
112. See id. at 192-93. Scholars taking a different view include Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't
Ask to Be Born: The American Lawo of Disinheritance and a Proposalfor a Change to a System of Pro-
tected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197 (1990); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the
Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83 (1994); Chester, supra note 106.
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analyses draw on her knowledge of the behavior-based law of suc-
cession in China, which is designed in part to encourage the care
of one's parents and elders.'13 Professor Foster has also powerfully
critiqued the extent to which American inheritance law focuses
on traditional family categories (e.g., spouse, child, and parent)
with little or no accommodation for the many other, and diverse,
bonds of love, care, and concern routinely formed in the modern
era."' We find this observation significant, because uncompensated
care is sometimes rendered by individuals outside the traditional
family."5
Other scholars tout the benefits of the "family maintenance" sys-
tems in use in England and many parts of the Commonwealth that
give probate judges more discretion than their American counter-
parts to vary the distribution of the decedent's estate."6 Like these
scholars, we are intrigued by the idea of judicial discretion as a
means to tailor the law to the circumstances of the particular case.
The distrust of American probate judges that animates some as-
pects of current succession law"'7 is warranted in some states,"8 but
not in all.
Still, we are realists. Reforms of the American law of succession
are most effectively realized through the Uniform Law Commission
and its UPC."' The UPC has been, in recent decades, the most
prominent vehicle of innovation in American succession law. This is
why working within the Commission's process of law reform is so
important. A plan radically to restructure the American law of
succession into a behavior-based model or, alternatively, into an
English-style "family maintenance" system would be a dead letter.
Our task in this Article is to devise a realistic proposal to amend
the UPC in order to recognize and promote caregiving within the
113. See generally Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from Chi-
na, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1199, 1202 (1999); Frances H. Foster, Toward a Behavior-Based Model of
Inheritance: The Chinese Experiment, U.C. DAvis L. REv. 77 (1998). For an earlier critique along
the same lines, see John T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 497 (1977).
114. See generally Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 199 (2001); Thomas P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REv.
55 (2004).
115. See infra note 126.
116. See, e.g., Chester, supra note 106, at 3; Shapo, supra note 106, at 780-81.
117. See Tate, supra note 103, at 167 (describing the judges handling probate matters in
Commonwealth jurisdictions, but not in the U.S., as "more or less uniformly competent").
118. See, e.g., Connecticut Probate Court System: Public Hearing Before the Legis. Program Review
and Investigations Comm., 2005-2006 Leg. Gen. Sess. (statement of John H. Langbein, Ster-
ling Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School), available at http://
www.law.yale.edu/faculty/1 766.htm.
119. For background on the Unifonn Probate Code, see GALLANIS, supra note 67, at
21-22.
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family. In so doing, we are mindful of the fundamental structure of
American succession law and, specifically, two of the law's core
features: an emphasis on fixed rules overjudicial discretion"o and a
deep commitment to donative freedom. 2 '
Donative freedom is not unfettered, however. As observed in
Part II, the provisions of a decedent's will are given effect only after
the decedent's debts are paid.22 The decedent's obligations have
priority over the decedent's whims.'2 ' Moreover, American succes-
sion law protects at least one member of the decedent's family
against disinheritance at the decedent's whim-namely, the surviv-
* 124ing spouse.
With these observations in mind, and with the goal of recogniz-
ing and promoting caregiving within the family, we propose that
the UPC should be amended to enable a family member who
provided the decedent with substantial uncompensated care in a
family residence to elect a share of the decedent's estate. (In this
context, "family member" means an individual other than the de-
cedent's surviving spouse, because the UPC already provides a
spousal elective share.) Our approach contrasts with the prevailing
law in the U.S., which views personal services rendered by family
members as gratuitous, hence not compensable. The scope and
amount of the caregiver's elective share can be structured by way of
analogy to the surviving spouse's elective share, though with im-
portant differences.
B. Specific Proposal
Our specific proposal is to provide an elective share to a family
member who provided substantial uncompensated care in a family
residence to the decedent. Five features of the proposal should be
noted. First, the proposal is directed at family caregiving. This ac-
cords with the emphasis in the UPC, and in American succession
120. See Glendon, supra note 106, at 1185 (describing U.S. succession law as "the tradi-
tional stronghold of fixed rules").
121. See GALLANIS, supra note 67, at 9 (observing that "[dionative freedom has a strong
cultural tradition in Anglo-American law").
122. See McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 46, at 626.
123. Id. The rights of the decedent's creditors against property passing through so-
called will substitutes are more complex and vary from one U.S. jurisdiction to another. See
generally CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, MEMORANDUM 2010-27, NONPROBATE TRANS-
FERS: CREDITOR CLAIMS AND FAMILY PROTECTION (BACKGROUND STUDY) (2010), available at
http://www.crc.ca.gov/pub/2010/MMO-27.pdf.
124. For analysis, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo.
L. REv. 21 (1994).
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law generally,12 5 on the family unit. We recognize that friends and
neighbors can and do provide uncompensated care, but the bur-
den of such caregiving is borne primarily by family members.'2 ,3
They are the focus of our proposal.
Second (but connected with the first), our definition of who
counts as a "family member" for purposes of the family caregiver's
elective share is designed to be as broad as feasible while remain-
ing largely consistent with the thrust of other UPC provisions.
Accordingly, we define a "family member" as a grandparent, a de-
scendant of a grandparent, a stepchild of the decedent, or a spouse
of one of these relatives. This is slightly more expansive than the
UPC's provisions on intestacy'' and antilapse for wills 28 and certain
nonprobate transfers. The inclusion of spouses has precedent in
the 2008 UPC amendments on the parent-child relationship. 0 Al-
so applicable to our definition of a "family member" are (1) the
UPC's thoughtful and up-to-date provisions on the definition of
parent and child, including the 2008 and 2010 amendments cover-
ing children of assisted reproduction'"' and (2) the UPC's wise and
helpful Legislative Note (at the beginning of Article II) on the
recognition of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and "similar re-
lationships between unmarried individuals." 32
125. SeeFoster, supra note 1l4, at 200-01.
126. See NAC/AARP 2oog REPORT, supra note 26, at fig. 12 (reporting that the caregiver
is a relative in 86 percent of the cases, and a nonrelative (friend, neighbor, or foster child)
in 14 percent of the cases).
127. U.P.C. § 2-103(a) provides inheritance rights to descendants, parents, descendants
of parents, grandparents, and descendants of grandparents. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103
(2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 40-41 (Supp. 2011). § 2-103(b), added in 2008, provides inher-
itance rights to some-but not all-stepchildren: to descendants of deceased spouse(s). 8
U.L.A. pt. I, at 40 (Supp. 2011).
128. See § 2-603(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 121 (Supp. 2011) ("If a devisee fails to survive the
testator and is a grandparent, a descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild . . . .").
129. See § 2-706(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 149-50 (Supp. 2011) ("If a beneficiary fails to sur-
vive the decedent and is a grandparent, a descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild of the
decedent. . . .").
130. See § 2-119(c), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 55 (Supp. 2011) ("A parent-child relationship exists
between both genetic parents and an individual who is adopted by a relative of a genetic
parent, or by the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of a genetic parent. . .
131. §§ 2-114 to -122,8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 50-66 (Supp. 2011).
132. Id. Legis. Note to Art. 11. Pref. Note, 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 33-34 (Supp. 2011) ("Refer-
ences to spouse or marriage appear throughout Article II. States that recognize civil unions,
domestic partnerships, or similar relationships between unmarried individuals should add
appropriate language wherever such references or similar references appear. States that do
not recognize such relationships between unmarried individuals, or marriages between
same-sex partners, are urged to consider whether to recognize the spousal-type rights that
partners acquired under the law of another jurisdiction in which the relationship was
formed but who die domiciled in this state. Doing so would not be the equivalent of recog-
nizing such relationships in this state but simply allowing those who move to and die in this
state to retain the rights they previously acquired elsewhere.").
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Third, our proposal is crafted by analogy to the surviving spouse's
elective share. An alternative reform-which we rejected-would
have been simply to repeal the presumption that family care is
rendered gratuitously, thus opening the door to claims against
the decedent's estate for the market value of the services ren-
dered. But this approach has two serious downsides. First, the
market value of the care could readily consume all or most of a
small or medium-sized estate, leaving little or nothing for the de-
cedent's other beneficiaries. Second, such a market-oriented view
(in which the decedent and the family caregiver are treated as
fundamentally economic actors, with the caregiver-as-creditor seek-
ing compensation for services rendered) does not recognize, and
indeed may corrode, the love and affection between family mem-
bers that the law of succession should reflect and encourage. Our
proposal aims to recognize and support caregiving without substi-
tuting economic self-interest for love and affection as the
motivating impulses. 3 3 Spouses care for each other for reasons in-
dependent of (but bolstered by) the spousal elective share. In the
same way, we hope and expect family members to continue to care
for each other for reasons independent of (but bolstered by) this
elective share. Our elective share is designed to recognize and
support familial bonds of love and concern, not to turn family
members into economic actors whose main impulse is to seek
compensation.
Fourth, we require the family member to have been the primary
caregiver' 4 and to have provided care in a family residence to the
decedent for a specified minimum time-in our draft, at least two
years out of the three years preceding the decedent's death 3 5 (to
allow for some episodes of hospitalization or skilled nursing care,
or-at the end of life-hospice care). To avoid problems of evi-
dence, to limit the extent of judicial discretion, and to reduce the
likelihood of an attempted unjustified claim, we require the family
133. For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, FORCED TO
CARE: COERCION AND CAREGIVING IN AMERICA 197-98 (2010) (rejecting the false dichotomy
that "people work either for money or for love" and observing with regret that "low wages
for care workers are rationalized on the grounds that care work offers intrinsic rewards ...
or even, especially in the case of family caregivers, that too much monetary compensation
would undermine altruistic feelings").
134. An alternative, which we rejected, would have been to open the elective share to
multiple family caregivers, with the elective-share amount apportioned among them in pro-
portion to the care each provided. But implementing this would be extremely difficult. We
are mindful that, in legislative reform, the perfect is sometimes the enemy of the good.
135. We base this type of provision on Professor Lawrence Waggoner's working draft of
an intestacy statute for unmarried partners, reproduced in Mary Louise Fellows et al., Com-
mitted Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 92-94 (1998); see also
Gallanis, supra note 114, at 86-91 (further refining the draft).
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member to establish the entitlement to an elective share by clear
and convincing evidence. The UPC takes a similar approach to the
standard of proof in its provisions governing survival and harmless
136error.
Fifth, the architecture of the family caregiver's elective share is
modeled somewhat on the innovative structure of the UPC's
spousal elective share. The caregiver's share (akin to the spouse's)
applies to the decedent's probate and nonprobate transfers alike,'37
in accordance with the UPC's policy and practice of applying the
same substantive rules to wills and will substitutes.' And just as the
spouse's share increases with the duration of the marriage, the
caregiver's share increases on a monthly basis, to reflect the duration
of the care provided-but in no event does the caregiver's share
exceed 25 percent of the augmented estate.139 In our proposal, we
have placed both the dollar figure and the maximum percentage in
brackets because we have no firm view on the precise figures;
however, the dollar amount should be well below market rates and
the maximum elective-share percentage should be substantially
lower for a family caregiver than for a spouse.
Translating all of this into statutory language, we propose
amending the UPC by adding a new Article II, Part 2A:
PART 2A
ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING FAMILY CAREGIVER
§ 2-2A01. DEFINITIONS.
(a) In this [part]:
(1) "Care" means services of the kind provided by
a home health aide or a personal care aide. 40
136. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 42 (Supp. 2011) (surviv-
al); § 2-503, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 108 (Supp. 2011) (harmless error); § 2-702, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at
182-84 (1998) (survival).
137. Cf § 2-203(a), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 78-79 (Supp. 2011) (providing that the surviving
spouse's elective-share rights extend not only to "the decedent's net probate estate" but also
to "the decedent's nonprobate transfers").
138. See id. art. II, pref. note (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 34 (Supp. 2011) ("The prolifera-
tion of will substitutes and other inter-vivos transfers was recognized, mainly, in measures
tending to bring the law of probate and nonprobate transfers into greater unison.").
139. Cf § 2-203(b), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 79 (Supp. 2011) (using a sliding scale, based on
the duration of the marriage, for the surviving spouse's elective share).
140. The terms "home health aide" and "personal care aide" are occupational classifica-
tions used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The description of a "home health aide" is
provided by Occupational Employment Statistics, BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://ww-w.bls.gov/oes/current/oes311011.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) ("Provide[s]
routine individualized healthcare such as . . . bathing, dressing, or grooming" to "elderly,
convalescents, or persons with disabilities . . . ."). The description of a "personal care aide" is
available at id. at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes399021.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
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(2) "Family member" means a grandparent, a de-
scendant of a grandparent, a stepchild, a spouse of
a grandparent, a spouse of a descendant of a
grandparent, or a spouse of a stepchild of the dece-
dent.
§ 2-2AO2. RIGHT OF ELECTIVE SHARE.
(a) [RIGHT OF ELECTION; ELECTIVE-SHARE AMOUNT]. A
surviving family member who establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that
(1) the family member was the primary provider of
care
(A) to a decedent dying domiciled in this
[state],
(B) in the decedent's residence or in the
family member's residence, and
(C) during the [three-year] period immedi-
ately preceding the decedent's death for
periods totaling at least [two years], and
(2) the value of the uncompensated care provided
by the family member to the decedent exceeded
[$1,500] per month of care,
has a right of election, under the limitations and conditions stated
in this [part], to take an elective-share amount equal to [$1,500]
per month of care but in no event to exceed [25] percent of the
value of the decedent's augmented estate.
(b) [EFFECT OF ELECTION ON STATUTORY BENEFITS.] If
the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of a
surviving family member of the decedent, the family
member's homestead allowance, exempt property,
and family allowance, if any, are not charged against
but are in addition to the elective-share amount.
(c) [NON-DOMICILIARY.] The right, if any, of a surviving
family member of a decedent who dies domiciled
outside this [state] to take an elective share in
property in this [state] is governed by the law of the
decedent's domicile at death.
§ 2-2A03. COMPOSITION OF AUGMENTED ESTATE. In this [part]:
"Augmented estate" means the sum of the values of all property,
2012) ("Assist[s] the elderly, convalescents, or persons with disabilities with daily living activ-
ities ... [including] keeping house (making beds, doing laundry, washing dishes) and
preparing meals.").
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whether real or personal, moveable or immovable, tangible or in-
tangible, wherever situated, that constitute
(1) the decedent's net probate estate as defined in Sec-
tion 2-204,41 and
(2) the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others, not
included within the definition of Section 2-204, as
defined in Section 2-205(1), reduced by exclusions
as provided in Section 2-208(a) and (c) (substitut-
ing "family member" for "spouse" in the last
sentence of Section 2-208(a)), and valued as pro-
vided in Section 2-208(b).
2-2AO4. SOURCES FROM WHICH ELECTIVE SHARE PAYABLE.
(a) In a proceeding for an elective share under this
[part], amounts included in the augmented estate
which pass or have passed to the surviving family
member are applied first to satisfy the elective-share
amount.
(b) If, after the application of subsection (a), the elec-
tive-share amount is not fully satisfied, liability for the
unsatisfied balance is apportioned among the recipi-
ents (other than the family member) of property
included in the augmented estate in proportion to
the value of their interests therein. 143
(c) The unsatisfied balance of the surviving family
member's elective share is treated as a general pe-
cuniary devise for purposes of Section 3-904.144
§ 2-2A05. OTHER ELECTIVE-SHARE PROVISIONS.
The provisions of Sections 2-210, 2-211, 2-212 (a), and 2-214 ap-
ply to this [part], substituting "family member" for "spouse" and
ignoring references to a "supplemental elective-share amount."
141. Here, as elsewhere in this Section, we incorporate current provisions of the UPC in
order to minimize redundancy.
142. Thus, if the decedent's probate and nonprobate transfers are more generous to
the caregiving child than the elective share, the child will decline the elective share. Cf
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-209(a)(1) (2011), 8 ULA. pt. I, at 86 (Supp. 2011) (containing a
similar provision regarding the surviving spouse's elective share).
143. Cf § 2-209(c)-(d), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 88 (Supp. 2011) (containing similar provi-
sions).
144. This section provides: "General pecuniary devises bear interest at the legal rate be-
ginning one year after the first appointment of a personal representative until payment,
unless a contrary intent is indicated by the will." § 3-904, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 271 (1998).
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CONCLUSION
Our law and public policy must grapple with the aging of the
population. The need for long-term care is increasingly urgent.
The law of succession cannot, by itself, solve the problem, but it
can contribute to a solution by recognizing and promoting family
caregiving.
This Article offers a proposal that builds on existing law. It
changes the law, but does so within its fundamental framework, by
creating an elective share for a family caregiver. Just as the spouse's
elective share is based on norms of reciprocal care and concern, so
too is the elective share for the family caregiver. In a sense, the
family caregiver is a partial substitute for the spouse-who, if alive
and able, would have acted instead. We encourage the Uniform
Law Commission and state legislatures to consider this proposal.
